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Russia: The Politics and Psychology of Overcommitment

Description

Data for Chapter 7 in The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Cornell University Press, 1984) The book from which this chapter is taken asks why the major European continental powers all began the First World War with offensive military strategies that failed to accomplish their political or military objectives and that helped to cause the war

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Suggested Citation

Snyder, Jack L. (2015) Data for: “Russia: The Politics and Psychology of Overcommitment” (165-198). The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914. 1984. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Active Citation Compilation, QDR:10047. Syracuse, NY: Qualitative Data Repository [distributor]. http://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS

PID QDR:10047 project
Geography Russia, Europe
Topic diplomacy, foreign policy, military planning, offense-defense theory, offensive strategy, security dilemma, World War I
Creator Jack Lewis Snyder, Department of Political Science, Columbia University (jls6@columbia.edu)
Collection Type Active Citation compilation
Version Original (Pilot Project)
Date 1980-01-01 to 1984-12-31
Temporal Coverage 1914-01-01 to 1914-12-31
Language English, Russian
Rights Standard access for all the files, which are either from publicly available documents or fair-use excerpts from secondary sources. The text of the original publication is used with explicit copyright permission obtained from Cornell University Press.
Publisher Qualitative Data Repository
DOI 10.5064/F6KW5CXS
View Active Citation data project here:

https://qdr.syr.edu/discover/projectcitationsnyder