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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics

Description

This project addresses the relationship between electoral strategies and distributive politics, in particular, between electoral strategies and clientelism. The authors distinguish clientelism from other forms of distributive politics in two ways. First, clientelist resources are targeted towards particular groups of voters, and are not distributed indiscriminately.

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Suggested Citation

Dunning, Thad and Edwin Camp. (2015) “Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics.” Data Collection, QDR:10055. Syracuse, NY: Qualitative Data Repository [distributor]. http://doi.org/10.5064/F6Z60KZB

PID QDR:10055 project
Geography Argentina, Latin America
Topic brokers, clientelism, developing democracy, distributive politics, machine politics, political parties
Creator Edwin Camp, Thad Dunning
Collection Type Data Collection
Version Original (Pilot Project)
Date 2008-01-01 to 2013-12-31
Temporal Coverage 2000-01-01 to 2012-12-31
Language Spanish
Rights The data files are available under conditional online access rules. Registered users interested in obtaining access to the files should contact QDR to request it, which will involve verifying their academic affiliation and presenting a research plan.

The data are sensitive. The survey asks political brokers about their political careers and a variety of questions that pertain to clientelism and party strategy. Still, sharing the data with proper steps taken for anonymization will not put the respondents at risk. No question on the survey required that a respondent admit to illegal behavior. Many of the questions were phrased in third-person, which allowed a broker to share her knowledge of local distributive politics without implicating herself. The responses to open-ended questions asked during the survey, in which respondents may have provided information that could put them at risk, will be evaluated to ensure that the confidentiality promised to the respondent is respected. This project has secured IRB approval and the respondents were promised confidentiality, and so each shared transcript has been anonymized.

Publisher Qualitative Data Repository
DOI 10.5064/F6Z60KZB
Related Publications

Camp, Edwin. (2015) "Cultivating Effective Brokers: A Party Leader's Dilemma." British Journal of Political Science. pp. 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000411

Stokes, Susan C, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. (2013) Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Cambridge University Press.

Files
1. Camp_Survey instrument and Consent form_DOCUMENTATION
PID: QDR:30565 file
2. Camp_Sampled municipalities response rates_DOCUMENTATION
PID: QDR:30566 file
3. Camp_Anonymization Protocol_DOCUMENTATION
PID: QDR:30567 file